Coordination in Games with Private Timing (joint with Sofia Moroni), June 2023.

• Online Appendix.

Cooperation in Revision Games and Some Applications (joint with Michihiro Kandori), 2020, Global Economic Review (Cho Prize Paper), 49(4): 329-348.

• This paper subsumes part of the results contained in our two working papers, Revision Games, Part I: Theory and Revision Games, Part II: Applications and Robustness with the Online Appendix here. Those papers subsume and supersede part of the results contained in an even earlier version Revision Games.

Optimal Timing of Policy Announcements in Dynamic Election Campaigns (joint with Takuo Sugaya), February 2020.

• Accepted, Quarterly Journal of Economics. Online Appendix. The paper refers to some results contained in a working paper version, and subsumes and supersedes part of an (older) working paper Valence Candidates and Ambiguous Platforms in Policy Announcement Games and its earlier version circulated as "Policy Announcement Game: Valence Candidates and Ambiguous Policies."

Negotiations with Limited Specifiability (joint with Satoshi Fukuda), March 2020.

• Accepted, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. Online Appendix.

Revision Games (joint with Michihiro Kandori), 2020, Econometrica, 88(4): 1599-1630.

• Online Appendix. Supplementary Information.
• This paper subsumes and supersedes part of the results contained in our two working papers, Revision Games, Part I: Theory and Revision Games, Part II: Applications and Robustness with the Online Appendix here. Those papers in turn subsume and supersede part of the results contained in an even earlier version Revision Games.

Multi-Agent Search with Deadline (joint with Nozomu Muto), January, 2015.

• This paper took us such a long time, but we proudly finished revising! The version with additional materials in the main text is here. An earlier version of the paper referred to in the new version is here.

Asynchronicity and Coordination in Common and Opposing Interest Games (joint with Riccardo Calcagno, Stefano Lovo, and Takuo Sugaya), 2014, Theoretical Economics, 9(2): 409-434.

• This paper is a result of a merger between two independent papers: Preopening and Equilibrium Selection by Calcagno and Lovo, and Asynchronous Revision Games with Deadline: Unique Equilibrium in Coordination Games by Kamada and Sugaya

Asynchronous Revision Games (joint with Michihiro Kandori), February 2012.

The Effect of Correlated Inertia on Coordination (joint with Yuhta Ishii), April 2011.

• Pdf coming soon.

Timing of Trades, Welfare, and Price Dispersion (joint with Ryota Iijima), 2014.

Multi-Agent Search with Deadline (joint with Nozomu Muto), August, 2014.

• After a long long revising, we finally completed the final (?) draft! An earlier version of this paper referred to in the new version is here.

Anything Goes in Squid Game: Sequential Voting with Informed and Uninformed Voters (joint with Yosuke Yasuda), October 2023.

• Online Appendix.

Optimal Timing of Policy Announcements in Dynamic Election Campaigns (joint with Takuo Sugaya), February 2020.

• Accepted, Quarterly Journal of Economics. Online Appendix. The paper refers to some results contained in a working paper version, and subsumes and supersedes part of an (older) working paper Valence Candidates and Ambiguous Platforms in Policy Announcement Games and its earlier version circulated as "Policy Announcement Game: Valence Candidates and Ambiguous Policies."

Extreme Donors and Policy Convergence (joint with Daisuke Hirata), 2020, Social Choice and Welfare, 55: 149-176.

• Previously circulated as "Electoral Policies with Campaign Contributions" and "Electoral Lobbyists and Policy Convergence"

Voter Preferences, Polarization, and Electoral Policies (joint with Fuhito Kojima), 2014, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(4): 203-236.

Legislative committees as information intermediaries: a unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules (joint with Attila Ambrus, Eduardo Azevedo, and Yuki Takagi), 2013, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 94: 103-115.

• Online supplementary note

The Equivalence Between Costly and Probabilistic Voting Models (joint with Fuhito Kojima), 2013, Games and Economic Behavior, 80: 179-185.

Rationalizable Partition-Confirmed Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Beliefs (joint with Drew Fudenberg), 2018, Games and Economic Behavior, 109: 364-381.

• Online Supplementary Appendix

Rationalizable Partition-Confirmed Equilibrium (joint with Drew Fudenberg), 2015, Theoretical Economics, 10(3): 775-806.

• Online Supplementary Appendix

Strongly Consistent Self-Confirming Equilibrium, 2010, Econometrica 78(2): 823-832.

Hierarchical cheap talk (joint with Attila Ambrus and Eduardo Azevedo), 2013, Theoretical Economics, 8(1): 233-261.

• Online supplementary note

Legislative committees as information intermediaries: a unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules (joint with Attila Ambrus, Eduardo Azevedo, and Yuki Takagi), 2013, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 94: 103-115.

• Online supplementary note

Social Distance and Network Structures (joint with Ryota Iijima), 2017, Theoretical Economics, 12(2): 655-689.

• Online Supplementary Appendix

Unprecedented (joint with Satoshi Fukuda), December 2024.

• Online Appendix.

Strategies in Stochastic Continuous-Time Games (joint with Neel Rao), December 2023.

• Online Appendix.

Dynamic User Competition in the Bitcoin Market (joint with Shunya Noda), 2022.

Negotiations with Limited Specifiability (joint with Satoshi Fukuda), March 2020.

• Accepted, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. Online Appendix.

Sequential Exchange with Stochastic Transaction Costs (joint with Neel Rao), August 2018.

• Online Appendix. Previously circulated as "Sequential Implementation of Unenforceable Contracts with Stochastic Transaction Costs"

Information Can Wreck Cooperation: A Counterpoint to Kandori (1992) (joint with Scott D. Kominers), 2010, Economics Letters, 107 (2): 112-114.

Choice or Competition: Does Integration Benefit Everyone? (joint with Fuhito Kojima), December 2024.

Ekkyo Matching: How to Connect Separate Matching Markets for Welfare Improvement (joint with Fuhito Kojima), 2023.

Fair Matching under Constraints: Theory and Applications (joint with Fuhito Kojima), October 2020.

• Accepted, Review of Economic Studies. Online Appendix.

Accommodating Various Policy Goals in Matching with Constraints (joint with Fuhito Kojima), 2019, Japanese Economic Review, 71 (Special Issue): 101-133.

• An earlier working paper version: General Theory of Matching under Distributional Constraints.

Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Matching with Constraints: A Necessary and Sufficient Condition (joint with Fuhito Kojima), 2018, Theoretical Economics, 13(2): 761-794.

Recent Developments in Matching with Constraints (joint with Fuhito Kojima), 2017, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 107(5): 200-204.

Stability Concepts in Matching under Distributional Constraints (joint with Fuhito Kojima) 2017, Journal of Economic Theory, 168: 107-142.

Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications (joint with Fuhito Kojima), 2015, American Economic Review, 105(1): 67-99.

• A non-technical introduction to this paper (written in Japanese) is here (written with Fuhito Kojima and Jun Wako)

Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Matching with Constraints: A Problem in the Japanese Medical Match and Its Solution (joint with Fuhito Kojima), 2012, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 102(3), 366-370.

(Non-refereed, invited) Matching Theory and Its Applications: "Regional Imbalance of Medical Residents" and Its Solutions (in Japanese) (joint with Fuhito Kojima and Jun Wako), 2011, Iryo-Keizai Kenkyu (Research in Health Economics), 23 (1): 5-19.