A link to Papers by Topic
Working Papers (Comments welcome)
Revision Games, Part II: Applications and Robustness (joint with Michihiro Kandori), April 2017.
Revision Games, Part I: Theory (joint with Michihiro Kandori), April 2017.
- This paper subsumes and extends part of the results contained in our earlier working paper, Revision Games.
Rationalizable Partition-Confirmed Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Beliefs (joint with Drew Fudenberg), January 2017.
Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Matching with Constraints: A Necessary and Sufficient Condition (joint with Fuhito Kojima), December 2016.
Sequential Exchange with Stochastic Transaction Costs (joint with Neel Rao), July 2016.
- Online Appendix. Previously circulated as "Sequential Implementation of Unenforceable Contracts with Stochastic Transaction Costs"
Games with Private Timing (joint with Sofia Moroni), July 2016.
Contracting with Word-of-Mouth Management (joint with Aniko Oery), July 2016.
- Online Supplementary Appendix. Previously circulated as "Encouraging Word of Mouth: Free Contracts, Referral Programs, or Both?"
- Previously circulated as "Naive and Sophisticated Pair-Dominant Choices."
General Theory of Matching under Distributional Constraints (joint with Fuhito Kojima), May 2015.
Multi-Agent Search with Deadline (joint with Nozomu Muto), January, 2015.
Valence Candidates and Ambiguous Platforms in Policy Announcement Games (joint with Takuo Sugaya), October 2014.
- Finally, the final version! Previously circulated as "Policy Announcement Game: Valence Candidates and Ambiguous Policies"
Timing of Trades, Welfare, and Price Dispersion (joint with Ryota Iijima), 2014.
The Effect of Correlated Inertia on Coordination (joint with Yuhta Ishii), April 2011.
Recent Developments in Matching with Constraints (joint with Fuhito Kojima), Accepted, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings.
Stability Concepts in Matching under Distributional Constraints (joint with Fuhito Kojima), Accepted, Journal of Economic Theory.
Social Distance and Network Structures (joint with Ryota Iijima), Forthcoming, Theoretical Economics.
Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications (joint with Fuhito Kojima), 2015, American Economic Review, 105(1): 67-99.
Rationalizable Partition-Confirmed Equilibrium (joint with Drew Fudenberg), 2015, Theoretical Economics, 10(3): 775-806.
Voter Preferences, Polarization, and Electoral Policies (joint with Fuhito Kojima), 2014, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(4): 203-236.
Legislative committees as information intermediaries: a unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules (joint with Attila Ambrus, Eduardo Azevedo, and Yuki Takagi), 2013, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 94: 103-115.
The Equivalence Between Costly and Probabilistic Voting Models (joint with Fuhito Kojima), 2013, Games and Economic Behavior, 80: 179-185.
Asynchronicity and Coordination in Common and Opposing Interest Games (joint with Riccardo Calcagno, Stefano Lovo, and Takuo Sugaya), 2014, Theoretical Economics, 9(2): 409-434.
- This paper is a result of a merger between two independent papers: Preopening and Equilibrium Selection by Calcagno and Lovo, and Asynchronous Revision Games with Deadline: Unique Equilibrium in Coordination Games by Kamada and Sugaya