A link to Papers by Topic
Working Papers (Comments welcome)
Anything Goes in Squid Game: Sequential Voting with Informed and Uninformed Voters (joint with Yosuke Yasuda), October 2023.
Strategies in Stochastic Continuous-Time Games (joint with Neel Rao), February 2023.
Dynamic User Competition in the Bitcoin Market (joint with Shunya Noda), 2022.
Sequential Exchange with Stochastic Transaction Costs (joint with Neel Rao), August 2018.
- Online Appendix. Previously circulated as "Sequential Implementation of Unenforceable Contracts with Stochastic Transaction Costs."
- Previously circulated as "Naive and Sophisticated Pair-Dominant Choices."
Multi-Agent Search with Deadline (joint with Nozomu Muto), January, 2015.
Timing of Trades, Welfare, and Price Dispersion (joint with Ryota Iijima), 2014.
Asynchronous Revision Games (joint with Michihiro Kandori), February 2012.
The Effect of Correlated Inertia on Coordination (joint with Yuhta Ishii), April 2011.
No paper in this category!
Fair Matching under Constraints: Theory and Applications (joint with Fuhito Kojima), October 2020.
- Accepted, Review of Economic Studies. Online Appendix.
Cooperation in Revision Games and Some Applications (joint with Michihiro Kandori), 2020, Global Economic Review (Cho Prize Paper), 49(4): 329-348.
- This paper subsumes part of the results contained in our two working papers, Revision Games, Part I: Theory and Revision Games, Part II: Applications and Robustness with the Online Appendix here. Those papers subsume and supersede part of the results contained in an even earlier version Revision Games.
Negotiations with Limited Specifiability (joint with Satoshi Fukuda), March 2020.
- Accepted, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. Online Appendix.
Optimal Timing of Policy Announcements in Dynamic Election Campaigns (joint with Takuo Sugaya), February 2020.
- Accepted, Quarterly Journal of Economics. Online Appendix. The paper refers to some results contained in a working paper version, and subsumes and supersedes part of an (older) working paper Valence Candidates and Ambiguous Platforms in Policy Announcement Games and its earlier version circulated as "Policy Announcement Game: Valence Candidates and Ambiguous Policies."
Extreme Donors and Policy Convergence (joint with Daisuke Hirata), 2020, Social Choice and Welfare, 55: 149-176.
- Previously circulated as "Electoral Policies with Campaign Contributions" and "Electoral Lobbyists and Policy Convergence"
Revision Games (joint with Michihiro Kandori), 2020, Econometrica, 88(4): 1599-1630.
- Online Appendix. Supplementary Information.
- This paper subsumes and supersedes part of the results contained in our two working papers, Revision Games, Part I: Theory and Revision Games, Part II: Applications and Robustness with the Online Appendix here. Those papers in turn subsume and supersede part of the results contained in an even earlier version Revision Games.
Contracting with Word-of-Mouth Management (joint with Aniko Oery), May 2019.
- Accepted, Management Science. Online Supplementary Appendix. Previously circulated as "Encouraging Word of Mouth: Free Contracts, Referral Programs, or Both?"
Accommodating Various Policy Goals in Matching with Constraints (joint with Fuhito Kojima), 2019, Japanese Economic Review, 71 (Special Issue): 101-133.
- An earlier working paper version: General Theory of Matching under Distributional Constraints.
Rationalizable Partition-Confirmed Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Beliefs (joint with Drew Fudenberg), 2018, Games and Economic Behavior, 109: 364-381.
Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Matching with Constraints: A Necessary and Sufficient Condition (joint with Fuhito Kojima), 2018, Theoretical Economics, 13(2): 761-794.
Recent Developments in Matching with Constraints (joint with Fuhito Kojima), 2017, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 107(5): 200-204.
Stability Concepts in Matching under Distributional Constraints (joint with Fuhito Kojima), 2017, Journal of Economic Theory, 168: 107-142.
Social Distance and Network Structures (joint with Ryota Iijima), 2017, Theoretical Economics, 12(2): 655-689.
Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications (joint with Fuhito Kojima), 2015, American Economic Review, 105(1): 67-99.
Rationalizable Partition-Confirmed Equilibrium (joint with Drew Fudenberg), 2015, Theoretical Economics, 10(3): 775-806.
Voter Preferences, Polarization, and Electoral Policies (joint with Fuhito Kojima), 2014, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(4): 203-236.
Legislative committees as information intermediaries: a unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules (joint with Attila Ambrus, Eduardo Azevedo, and Yuki Takagi), 2013, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 94: 103-115.
The Equivalence Between Costly and Probabilistic Voting Models (joint with Fuhito Kojima), 2013, Games and Economic Behavior, 80: 179-185.
Asynchronicity and Coordination in Common and Opposing Interest Games (joint with Riccardo Calcagno, Stefano Lovo, and Takuo Sugaya), 2014, Theoretical Economics, 9(2): 409-434.
- This paper is a result of a merger between two independent papers: Preopening and Equilibrium Selection by Calcagno and Lovo, and Asynchronous Revision Games with Deadline: Unique Equilibrium in Coordination Games by Kamada and Sugaya