

## 「ゲーム理論入門の入門」参考文献集

鎌田雄一郎

ここには、「ゲーム理論入門の入門」（岩波新書）を書く際に参照した文献を列挙します。これは「参考資料を明確にしておく」という研究者の責務を遂行するためにしていることであり、必ずしも読者の皆さんにこれらの文献に当たってほしいということではありません（もちろん、これらの文献に当たっていただくのも、それはそれでとても良いことです）。読者の皆さんのための「読書案内」が本書末、160-162ページにありますので、ゲーム理論のことをもっと知りたい、という方はまずそちらをご覧くださいをお勧めします。

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